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The Honorable Harvey L. Pitt 
Chairman 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
Judiciary Plaza 
450 Fifth Street, NW 
Washington, DC  20549 
 
Mr. Robert K. Herdman 
Chief Accountant 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
Judiciary Plaza 
450 Fifth Street, NW 
Washington, DC  20549 
 
 
Increasing Public Confidence in Financial Reporting: 
A Call to Reevaluate Auditors’ Responsibilities  
 
 
Gentlemen: 
 
The authors of this letter, members of or consultants to the Transition 
Oversight Staff and the staff of the Panel on Audit Effectiveness, share with 
many others a concern over the public’s diminished confidence in the 
integrity of audited financial statements.  We believe that both auditors and 
users of financial statements have varying views about the auditor’s 
responsibility to detect misstatements in financial statements, particularly 
misstatements caused by management fraud.  Accordingly, we believe that 
the SEC should request the newly-legislated Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB), as one of its first projects, to examine and 
reevaluate the level of assurance that the auditor should provide in a 
financial statement audit.   
 
Generally accepted auditing standards require the auditor to obtain 
reasonable assurance that the financial statements are free of material 
misstatements, whether caused by error or fraud.  Having established the 
threshold of reasonable assurance, auditing standards then describe a 
number of limitations on the auditor’s ability to detect fraud, such as the 
 2
concealment and collusive aspects of fraud and the ability of management to 
override internal controls.  These limitations result in the level of assurance 
pertaining to misstatements from fraud appearing to be less than that 
pertaining to misstatements from error, although the auditor’s opinion on the 
financial statements does not distinguish between the two.  (For example, 
existing auditing standards note that “even a properly planned and performed 
audit may not detect a material misstatement resulting from fraud,” but those 
standards contain no similar disclaimer regarding detection of material 
misstatements resulting from error.)  As a result, both auditors and users of 
financial statements are left uncertain about the extent of the auditor’s 
responsibility to detect material fraud.   
 
The Auditing Standards Board (ASB) is considering whether the concept of 
reasonable assurance as the benchmark for defining the auditor’s 
responsibility should be among the issues it will address in its strategic 
planning project.  The issue also has been identified in correspondence to 
the ASB from the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board, 
and it has been discussed at meetings of the ASB and the Quality Control 
Inquiry Committee of the SEC Practice Section.  We wish to make clear that 
we are not prejudging whether the auditor’s responsibility to detect fraud 
should be raised, lowered, or left unchanged.  We are suggesting, however, 
that the appropriateness of the reasonable assurance standard for all types 
of misstatements should be reevaluated in the context of today’s financial 
reporting environment. 
 
We believe that the examination and reevaluation that we are suggesting 
should be conducted in an open forum, either by the PCAOB itself or by a 
“Blue Ribbon” committee appointed by the PCAOB and composed of 
investors and other financial statement users, directors, auditors, and others 
interested in reliable financial reporting.  Specifically, the reevaluation should 
consider such threshold issues as what the objectives of an audit should be 
and whether they should differ based on the type of misstatement.  This 
undertaking also should consider the difficult and important issue of the costs 
and benefits to society of alternative levels of assurance that an auditor could 
provide about whether audited financial statements are free of material error 
and fraud, particularly in the face of unpredictable management override of 
controls.  We suggest that the project consider the views of users, regulators, 
and auditing standards-setters from other countries. 
 
The scope of the project should be carefully defined and the project 
expeditiously completed.  We do not envision a full scale investigation into 
either the auditing profession as a whole (such as was undertaken by the 
Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities and the Panel on Audit 
Effectiveness) or into fraudulent financial reporting in general (such as was 
undertaken by the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting).  
We believe that a clear statement of the level of assurance that auditors 
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should provide in a financial statement audit would assist both the Board 
itself in deciding the future direction of auditing standards and investors and 
other financial statement users in understanding what those standards are 
designed to accomplish. 
 
 
 
 
cc: James S. Gerson, Chair, Auditing Standards Board 
 Robert J. Kueppers, Chair, SEC Practice Section Executive Committee  
Barry C. Melancon, President and CEO, American Institute of CPAs 
